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Abstract: 
 
There can be no doubt that Michio Morishima and Takashi Negishi are two of the most important historians of 
economic thought of the recent past. Both authors contributed numerous papers and books to the subject, dealing 
with the works of major economists from the very inception of systematic economic thought at the time of the 
classical economists up until modern times. And both authors combined a vivid interest in modern economic 
theory with an interest in what past masters had to say. 
The paper assesses and compares the motivations of the two authors to engage in the history of economic 
theories, their similar, but different approaches to do historical research, and their achievements in this regard. 
Given the remarkable amount of work each one of them accomplished, the paper has to focus attention on a 
subset of the themes the two authors  dealt with. The emphasis will be on (i) their treatment of the classical 
theories of value, distribution and capital accumulation, especially those of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, (ii) 
their discussion of the contributions of Karl Marx and some Marxists, (iii) their interpretation of some early and 
mature marginalist economists, especially Léon Walras, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Knut Wicksell, and (iv) 
their views about the achievements of John Maynard Keynes. Given the intrinsic complexity of each of these 
themes, it goes without saying that the paper is bound to proceed largely in terms of synthetic statements. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper scrutinises and compares the contributions of two eminent and internationally 
renown Japanese scholars to the history of economic thought, the late Michio Morishima and 
Takashi Negishi. Both are leading theorists, who, however, saw their own analytical work as 
firmly embedded in the flow of economic ideas during the past three centuries since the 
inception of systematic economic thought. They learned from past authors, benefitted from 
combining some of their ideas in order to create something new and rejected the view that the 
history of economic thought is a grave containing the dead ideas of dead people. They rather 
saw it as a treasure trove, rich with ideas and concepts that still have to be explored and 
                                                
*  This paper was given at the 2nd Joint Conference of JSHET and ESHET on “The 
Dissemination of Economic Ideas”, 21-22 March 2009, in Tokyo. I should like to thank the 
participants at the conference for useful discussions and an anonymous referee for valuable 
suggestions. Any remaining errors are, or course, entirely my responsibility. 
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developed and brought to fruition by cross-breeding them with other ideas and concepts.1 The 
two also referred to each other’s works and commented on the ideas contained therein. They 
even involved each other in debate and controversy on a number of issues. 
Michio Morishima is especially known for his innovative work on the multi-sectoral theory of 
economic growth and income distribution, generalising John von Neumann’s model (1945) in 
order to cover a number of phenomena not dealt with in its original formulation. These 
include, inter alia, a discussion of different savings propensities out of wages and profits, 
different forms of technical progress, the turnpike problem, and the role of money, credit and 
interest in the growth process (see Morishima, 1964, 1969, 1992). Morishima is concerned 
with developing ‘a new formulation of general equilibrium’, thus the subtitle of one of his 
books (Morishima, 1992), or, more precisely, an alternative formulation to the general 
equilibrium theory in the tradition of Arrow and Debreu. The new formulation is supposed to 
offer ‘a more satisfactory model of general equilibrium’ (1992, p. 2) that is not tied to Say’s 
law and therefore may incorporate important ideas of Marx, Walras, Keynes and Schumpeter, 
in particular the problem of unemployment. Takashi Negishi is especially known for his 
innovative contributions to general equilibrium theory in the tradition of Arrow and Debreu. 
Among other things, he provided an alternative proof of the existence of a competitive 
general equilibrium by searching for a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources at which the 
budget constraints of all the consumers are satisfied at efficiency prices. The proof was first 
published in Metroeconomica (Negishi, 1960), a journal I have the privilege of editing 
together with Neri Salvadori since a few years. The method of the proof has since then been 
used especially in numerical computations of general equilibria. 
In this paper special attention will be paid to the two authors’ studies of the works of some of 
the most important economists ever, in particular Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, 
Léon Walras, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Knut Wicksell and John Maynard Keynes. While 
Morishima’s contributions are mostly in the form of books devoted to the works of major 
authors (see especially Morishima, 1973, 1977, 1989), Negishi’s are mostly in the form of 
short articles that are conveniently collected in three volumes (Negishi, 1993d, 1994, 2000; 
but see also Negishi, 1989). How did the two scholars interpret the works of leading 
economists, which of their ideas did they find convincing and which not? 
                                                
1  The combinatoric metaphor as an abstract description of the process of how new 
knowledge is generated by reconfiguring and recombining old pieces of knowledge can be 
traced far back in the history of natural philosophy. It was used, amongst others, by Adam 
Smith and Joseph Alois Schumpeter; see, for example, Kurz (2006, 2008). 
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2. The Classical economists 
Both Morishima and Negishi studied carefully the classical authors. Morishima’s main 
interest appears to have been David Ricardo’s magnum opus, the Principles, and the 
contributions of those who developed Ricardo’s ideas, especially Piero Sraffa, Nicholas 
Kaldor (1955-56) and Luigi Pasinetti (1960). In addition to Ricardo, Negishi focused on 
Adam Smith and especially his ‘magnificent dynamics’, that is, Smith view of the process of 
capital accumulation, population growth and the growth of labour productivity entailed by a 
widening and deepening of the division of labour. Here we deal first and foremost with the 
two authors’ disquisitions on Ricardo. 
In the preface to his book Ricardo’s Economics. A General Equilibrium Theory of 
Distribution and Growth, Morishima states that ‘this volume is not primarily a book on 
history of economic analysis but a reappraisal of past great economists from the viewpoint of 
contemporary economic theory’ (1989, p. vii). Together with Marx’s Economics (1973) and 
Walras’s Economics (1977), on which more below, it forms a trilogy. In terms of the 
conventional (but problematic) distinction between historical and rational reconstructions, all 
three works mentioned belong predominantly to the second class. 
Value and distribution 
The characteristic feature of Morishima’s respective works is that he looks upon past authors 
through the lens of an extended version of John von Neumann’s paper ‘A Model of General 
Economic Equilibrium’ (1945). It is this perspective that makes him maintain that the 
analyses of the three authors are much more similar than is generally held. He actually 
contends that they are characterised by a unité de doctrine (1989, p. 4). 
One my wonder whether this contention can be sustained. One difference between the 
classical authors an Marx, on the one hand, and Walras and the marginalist authors, on the 
other, is too obvious to be overlooked. The former treated wages and property incomes 
(profits and rents) asymmetrically, and explained the latter in terms of the surplus product or 
residual that remains after all means of production used up and the means of subsistence in 
the support of workers have been subtracted from gross outputs levels. On the contrary, the 
latter treated all kinds of incomes alike, that is, symmetrically, with reference to the ‘forces of 
demand and supply’ interacting in the respective factor markets, and thus in terms of the 
relative scarcities of the different factors, or their marginal productivities. In the former, real 
 4 
or commodity wages are taken to be a part and parcel of the inputs needed in production and 
are thus essentially reckoned as an element of the capital advanced at the beginning of the 
production period, whereas in the latter they are treated as a part of the product that emerges 
as the result of the co-operation of the different productive forces.2 
Before we proceed, it is interesting to note that the von Neumann model, which forms the 
basis from which Morishima develops his argument, shares a similar outlook on economic 
phenomena as the classical economists (see Kurz and Salvadori, 1993). Von Neumann takes 
the real wage rate as given and paid ante factum. Technically, he explicitly subsumes the 
means of subsistence of workers under the coefficients of the input matrix A of his model, 
that is, employs what he called the ‘augmented matrix’ (Morishima, 1964 and 1969). At given 
levels of the operation of the different processes of production, profits (or interest, as von 
Neumann prefers to call them) consist physically of the net product, or social surplus. As 
Ricardo stressed: ‘Profits come out of the surplus product’ (Ricardo, Works II, pp. 130-1; 
similarly I, p. 95). When it comes to the determination of the rate of return on capital and 
relative prices, real wages are thus treated as a given magnitude both in the classical authors 
and in von Neumann. Also Marx adopted this approach from the classical authors and 
especially Ricardo and attempted to ascertain the general rate of profit as the ratio of the 
labour value of the surplus product, or surplus value, and the labour value of the social 
capital, consisting of a constant (means of production) and a variable (wage goods) capital. 
While Ricardo and Marx were able to expound and develop in some detail the classical 
surplus-based approach to the theory of value and distribution, they did not succeed in 
providing a logically coherent version of it. This was only achieved by John von Neumann, 
apparently without being aware of the classical features of his approach, because it can safely 
be assumed that he was not familiar with the writings of the classical authors3, and then, in a 
more general analytical framework and with a thorough understanding of the classical 
authors, by Piero Sraffa (1960). 
                                                
2  For a counterposition of the analytical structures of the approaches to the theory of 
value and distribution of especially Ricardo and Walras, see Kurz and Salvadori (1995, 
chapter 1, and 2002). (As will become clear below, Negishi also appears to see the main 
difference between the two different schools of thought as consisting in different theories of 
income distribution.) As regards the classical authors’ treatment of workers’ participation in 
the sharing out of the surplus product, see below. 
3  On a possible link between Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz, who was well read in the 
classical authors and Marx and had formalised some of their ideas, on the one hand, and von 
Neumann via Robert Remak, on the other, one of his mathematical colleagues, see Kurz and 
Salvadori (1993).  
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Morishima deals not only with Ricardo’s theory of value and distribution, but also with other 
aspects of his analysis, including rent theory, durable instruments of production, the problem 
of the standard of value, the natural wage doctrine, the theory of comparative advantage and 
Say’s law in connection with the problem of machinery. For a critical assessment of his 
respective discussions, see Kurz and Salvadori (1992). Here we comment only on the last 
three issues mentioned. 
Natural wages 
Ricardo distinguished not only with regard to commodities but also with regard to labour a 
‘natural’ and a ‘market’ price. In some places, apparently focusing attention on a self-
replacing state of the economic system, he defined the ‘natural wage’ as that wage that is just 
sufficient to allow for the reproduction of the labour force, without any increase or 
diminution. However, with the rate of profit falling as capital accumulates and population 
grows due to extensive and intensive diminishing returns in agriculture, and setting aside 
technical progress, Ricardo’s doctrine has widely been interpreted as revolving around the 
concept of a given and constant long-run subsistence wage. While in an ‘improving society’ 
natural wages are typically higher than in a stagnant one because via the wage rate the growth 
of population is adjusted to the requirements of accumulation, in a stationary state they are 
down to the subsistence level. Yet this is too narrow a view of Ricardo’s doctrine. While 
several of Morishima’s statements on the issue I find problematic, I think he is right in 
pointing out that the concept of natural wage in Ricardo is a much more complex concept than 
is usually understood and that it is often defined in conjunction with the rate of capital 
accumulation: The two are attuned to one another in such a way that the natural level of the 
real wage rate, via the growth of hands, sustains the accumulation rate, and the accumulation 
rate, via its impact on the demand for hands, sustains the real wage. Hence Ricardo’s position 
in this regard is not all that different from Adam Smith’s.4  
There is a point of contact here between Morishima’s analysis and an argument put forward 
by Negishi in a paper on Adam Smith’s theory of growth (Negishi, 1993c). As regards the 
population mechanism Smith sees at work, it anticipates an important element of Thomas 
Robert Malthus’s analysis in that it also contemplates a positive relationship between the real 
                                                
4  For a different view, see Negishi (1988 and 1994, p. xiii), who credits exclusively 
Smith with considering the natural wage rate as interdependent with the growth rate.  
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wage rate and the growth rate of polulation.5 We may express the idea in simple terms as 
involving a relationship of the following kind 
w = (1 + g)w* 
where g is the rate of growth of the work force, w* is the real wage rate in a stationary system 
and w is the wage rate that attunes g to the requirements of capital accumulation. One might 
incorporate a ratchet effect in this, reflecting Ricardo’s conviction that with a higher level of 
the real wage rate workers will adjust to the new situation and develop needs and wants that 
render necessaries what previously were comforts or even luxuries. 
The above ideas co-exist in Ricardo’s writings and reflect the complexity of his thoughts and 
variability of the conditions contemplated. It should therefore come as no surprise that 
different interpreters, focusing attention on differents bits of his analysis, would come to 
different conclusions concerning his doctrine. The fact is that these elements are all there. 
What should be clear, though, is that the natural wage must not be mistaken for a purely 
physiological minimum of subsistence (Ricardo, Works, I, pp. 96-7). Ricardo, like other 
classical authors with their emphasis on the social and historical factors shaping economic 
behaviour,  even anticipated what was to become a most important empirical fact, namely, 
that economic development and the emergence of new institutions endogenously eroded the 
Malthusian population mechanism. Thus Ricardo contemplated the possibility that 
‘population may be so little stimulated by ample wages as to increase at the slowest rate – or 
it may even go in a retrograde direction' (Ricardo, Works, VIII, p. 169).  
Ricardo also discussed the case of workers participating in the sharing out of the surplus 
product.6 In this case he felt the need to replace the concept of a given real (i.e. commodity) 
wage rate by a share concept, or ‘proportional wages’ (Sraffa, 1951, p. lii), that is, ‘the 
proportion of the annual labour of the country ... devoted to the support of the labourers’ 
(Works, I, p. 49). It was on the basis of the new wage concept (and on the premise that the 
social capital consisted only of, or could entirely be reduced to, wages) that Ricardo then 
                                                
5  Since Malthus contemplates also the case of unemployment, what matters for the rate 
of population growth is the real income of families, which depends not only on hourly wages 
paid, but also on the levels of employment of the different members of a family. This aspect 
need not concern us here. 
6  According to Morishima ‘Ricardo considered both capitalists and landowners as 
savers’. In fact he even contemplated also the possibility of workers saving. Ricardo may thus 
be said to have anticipated the basic idea underlying what became known as the Post-
Keynesian theory of growth and distribution; see especially Kaldor (1955-56) and Pasinetti 
(1962). 
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asserted what was called his ‘fundamental proposition on distribution’: that the rate of profits 
depends on proportional wages, and on nothing else. 
Foreign trade 
I do not think that the criticism Morishima levels at Ricardo’s trade theory, contained in 
Chapter VII, ‘On Foreign Trade’, of the Principles, can be sustained. According to Morishima 
the chapter ‘begins on the wrong foot and results in confusion and incomprehensibility’ 
(1989, p. 128). Ricardo is said to have been particularly wrong in rejecting Smith’s view that 
the opening of trade increases the rate of profit. However, there appears to be a 
misunderstanding on Morishima’s part here. On the assumption of a given real (or 
commodity) wage rate, the opening of trade, by rendering some wage goods less expensive, 
implies a reduction in the nominal wage rate. Ricardo concluded that profitability will 
increase for a given and constant real wage rate, if trade entails a lowering of the price of 
(some) wage goods, whereas a lowering of the price of luxuries would have no such effect. 
This is an important insight which carries a distinction encountered in Ricardo’s discussion of 
different forms of technical progress over to the realm of international trade. In Ricardo’s 
view trade and specialisation typically involve larger rates of profits of the countries involved 
and thus corroborate his conviction that foreign trade and improved machinery may have 
similar effects: ‘If … by the extension of foreign trade, or by improvements in machinery, the 
food and necessaries of the labourer can be brought to the market at a reduced price, [the rate 
of] profits will rise’ (Ricardo, Works, Vol. I, p. 132). 
This view is neatly corrobrated by Negishi in his paper ‘The Labor Theory of Value in the 
Ricardian Theory of International Trade’ (1982c) which focuses attention on Ricardo’s 
famous numerical example of comparative costs.7 He takes issue with the received 
marginalist (or neoclassical) interpretation of the example which contends that the latter is 
based on the assumption that there is only a single factor of production, labour. Negishi 
rightly insists that this is not so, because Ricardo’s argument is naturally developed against 
the background of an economic system that involves the use of land, produced means of 
production (and means of subsistence, or capital) and labour. Interestingly, Negishi also 
rejects the view that Ricardo cannot determine the terms of trade without having recourse to 
considerations concerning the demand for commodities, as a long tradition of interpreting 
Ricardo taking off from John Stuart Mill contends. In this regard he elaborates on an 
                                                
7  Negishi (1996a and 1996b) are closely related papers. In each of them Negishi takes 
the contributions of K. Kojima to Ricardo’s trade theory as one of his starting points; see 
below. 
 8 
argument put forward by K. Kojima. Negishi stresses that Ricardo was aware of the fact that 
the opening of trade increases the domestic rate of profits for a given real wage rate (provided 
wage goods and not only luxuries are involved).8 
Let us immediately turn to the gist of Negishi’s argument. He assumes that the real wage per 
unit of labour employed is the same in both countries, Portugal (P) and England (E), and is 
given in terms of a fixed bundle of wage goods, consisting of c1 units of cloth and c2 units of 
wine. Both products are produced with constant returns to scale production processes that 
employ only wage capital. Hence in autarky the price equations in the two countries are given 
by 
    p1j = (1 + rj) l1j (c1p1j + c2p2j) 
    p2j = (1 + rj) l2j (c1p1j + c2p2j) 
where j = P, E. From the two equations and Ricardo’s numerical example [(l1P = 90; l2P = 80), 
(l1E = 100; l2E = 120)], it can immediately be seen that 
– in autarky the price ratio of the two commodities, p1j/p2j, equals the ratio of direct 
national labour inputs, l1j/l2j: cloth is relatively less expensive in England and wine is 
relatively less expensive in Portugal; 
– the rate of profits in autarky is the higher the higher is labour productivity (the lower is 
the direct labour coefficient) in each domestic sector, given the real wage rate; 
– in autarky the rate of profits is higer in Portugal than in England, because Portugal 
exhibits a higher productivity of labour than England in both industries. 
After trade begins, the prices of cloth and wine are taken to become the same in the two 
countries, because transportation costs and the like are set aside. This means, as Negishi 
points out (1982c, p. 206), that with a given and uniform real wage rate money wages are 
equalized between the two countries. According to the principle of comparative advantage, 
Portugal will specialize in the production of wine and England in the production of cloth. 
Negishi shows that in the trade situation the three distributive variables rP, rE and the 
(common) real wages rate (c1, c2) are related in the following way 
    RPRE – 100c1RP – 80c2RE = 0,    (*) 
where RP = 1/(1 + rP) and RE = 1/(1 + rE). 
                                                
8  In Negishi’s model we discuss below there are only two commodities both of which 
enter the real wage rate and are thus what the classical economists called ‘necessaries’ as 
opposed to luxuries. For a discussion of the latter, see Negishi (1989, pp. 136-8). 
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Obviously, the case in which rP = rE (and thus RP = RE) is a very special constellation 
implying risk- and costless capital investment in both countries. Yet if that constellation 
prevails it is clear that relative prices are fully determined, because in this case Portugal and 
England have been replaced by a larger economy that produces the two commodities in two 
industries only instead of in four, where industry 1 uses the English method of production and 
industry 2 the Portuguese one. 
Yet as Negishi rightly points out, this is not the most interesting case Ricardo contemplated in 
his chapter on trade. The reason is that capital movements may face difficulties and 
insecurities. Ricardo in fact stressed: 
Experience … shews, that the fancied or real insecurity of capital, when not under the 
immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every 
man has to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and intrust himself with all his 
habits fixed, to a strange government and new laws, check the emigration of capital. 
These feelings, which I should be sorry to see weakened, induce most men of property 
to be satisfied with a low rate of profits in their own country, rather than seek a more 
advantageous employment for their wealth in foreign nations. (Ricardo, Works I, pp. 
136-7) 
In such cases capital mobility will be hampered and together with it from a certain point 
onwards a tendency towards a uniform rate of return on capital worldwide. In Ricardo’s 
example, a higher rate of profits in Portugal can, in principle, be expected to attract English 
capital. Yet if English importers and exporters are satisified with a decent rate of profits at 
home rather than seek a higher rate abroad, there will be no full equalization of profitability. 
Negishi (1982c, p. 207) formulates the basic idea by defining a ‘rate of conversion a (< 1)’ by 
which English capitalists ‘discount’ rP in case it is higher than rE: 
     RP = aRE. 
Then equation (*) becomes 
    RE = 100c1 + (80/a)c2. 
Clearly, a larger a involves a smaller RE and thus a larger rE: English capitalists benefit from 
their discounting profitability elsewhere. For a given conversion rate a, rE is determined and 
together with it rp and the price ratio of the two commodities in the ‘world market’ (consisting 
of Portugal and England). Negishi conludes: ‘Ricardian theory can determine the terms of 
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trade on the basis of cost-price relations without having recourse to reciprocal 
demands’ (1982c, p. 208). And in another paper he insists: 
Neoclassical theory of international trade cannot determine the terms of trade, without 
taking the reciprocal demand into consideration. Those who consider Ricardo’s theory 
as a special case of the neoclassical one naturally regard the former as merely a partial 
theory of international trade, which by itself cannot determine the terms of trade, having 
no consideration of the reciprocal demand. This interpretation of Ricardo is, however, 
clearly a misunderstanding of neoclassical economists. (Negishi, 1996a, p. 234; 
emphasis added) 
He adds: 
The lesson from [this] reinterpretation of Ricardo’s magic numbers of comparative 
advantage is that the study of the classical theory from the point of view of modern 
theory should not be a cutting or stretching of the former theory in a Procrustean bed of 
the latter. It should be a mirror in which modern theory finds the importance of what it 
forgot to learn from the classical theory, in this case, the role of exporters and importers 
in international trade and investment. (Negishi, 1996a, p. 235; emphasis added) 
Negishi’s is an interesting reconstruction of a central element of Ricardo’s theory of trade that 
for simplicity sets aside the problem of scarce land(s). 
Seen from a higher standpoint, Negishi’s reconstruction may be said to be covered by the so-
called Non-substitution Theorem9. The Theorem applied to the present case states that relative 
prices and the rate of profits in the two countries are independent of the pattern of final 
demand provided (i) there are constant returns to scale throughout both economies, (ii) there 
is no joint production (and thus no fixed capital), (iii) there is only a single original factor of 
production (homogeneous labour), and (iv) the real wage rate and the ratio of the two 
domestic profit rates are given (from within a feasible range).10 These conditions are met by 
Negishi’s reconstruction of Ricardo’s argument.11 
                                                
9  See Kurz and Salvadori (1995, pp. 26-8; on the application of the Non-substitution 
Theorem to Ricardo’s trade argument, see p. 152). 
10  The possible range of a satisfying Ricardo’s numerical example is 80/120 ≤ a ≤ 
90/100; see Negishi (1982c, p. 208). 
11  It goes without saying that with nonconstant returns to scale in one or both industries, 
the argument would have to be adopted. Diminishing returns are typically associated with 
agriculture where the scarcity of land may make itself felt in increasing unit costs as output 
increases, whereas increasing returns to scale may result from an increase in the extent of the 
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Machinery and Say’s law 
As is well known, in the third edition of the Principles Ricardo recanted his previously held 
view that improved machinery cannot be injurious to the interests of the class of labourers. He 
had convinced himself that the mechanisation of production – the substitution of machine 
power for labour power – involves a destruction of the circulating capital and thus of 
necessity leads to a ‘diminution in the demand for labour, population will become redundant, 
and the situation of the labouring classes will be that of distress and poverty’ (Works, I, p. 
390). 
Morishima (1989, p. 11) contends that Ricardo’s argument is fundamentally flawed and that 
Say’s law does not admit of unemployment. Morishima therefore feels entitled to modify the 
famous numerical example Ricardo had elaborated in order to illustrate the case of 
technologically induced unemployment. 
I see especially two problems with Morishima’s argument. First, he interprets Say’s law in the 
modern (marginalist) sense as involving the clearing of all markets, including a ‘labour 
market’.12 Yet, this is not the sense in which Ricardo or his contemporaries used it: They 
confined Say’s law to markets, in which commodities are exchanged that have been produced 
in the hope and expectation of making profits, i.e. capitalistically. Labour (or, in Marx’s 
terminology, labour power) does not belong to them: it is not capitalistically produced. Hence 
the law does not apply to it, and indeed we do not find in Ricardo a discussion of the ‘labour 
market’. Ricardo rather stressed that ‘M. Say … has most satisfactorily shewn, that there is no 
amount of capital which may not be employed in a country, because demand is only limited 
by production.’ And, ‘there is no limit to demand – no limit to the employment of capital 
while it yields any profit’ (Works, I, pp. 290 and p. 296; emphases added). Ricardo’s finding 
that the introduction of improved machinery may displace workers therefore does not 
contradict the then prevalent version of the ‘law of markets’. 
Secondly, Morishima’s reworking of Ricardo’s numerical example empties Ricardo’s 
reasoning of its very content. As Negishi (2000, p. 103) stressed: ‘Apparently, Morishima’s 
problem is different from Ricardo’s machinery problem.’ Ricardo is interested in the problem 
of whether the production of a new machine, and then its productive use, changes the overall 
                                                                                                                                                   
market and the ensuing scope for a deeper social division of labour. These themes are, 
however, beyond the scope of Negishi’s and also the present paper.  
12  Morishima says so explicitly: ‘we define the law in the same way that Keynes did’ 
(1989, p. 54; see also p. 164). Now Keynes, as is well known, defined the law in the received 
marginalist full employment sense (which he, erroneoulsy, considered to be the ‘classical’ 
sense as well). 
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composition of the capital stock of the miniature system under consideration, away from 
criculating capital, which is (for the main part) used to employ workers, and towards fixed 
capital, which is not used to do so. Ricardo identifies this shift as the source of the trouble. 
Contrary to his claim, Morishima’s alternative construction contains no discussion of the 
replacement of human labour by machinery, which was Ricardo’s main concern. 
Interestingly, Negishi (1998a) in a critical comment rejected Morishima’s argument on the 
ground that it did not contain a faithful interpretation of Ricardo’s reasoning and therefore 
could not disprove the latter’s opinion on the matter.  
We may conclude by saying that while Morishima’s interpretation of Ricardo contains some 
interesting observations on how to develop the argument and formalise certain parts of it, in 
important respects the interpretation is difficult to sustain. The view that Ricardo, Marx and 
Walras shared a similar approach to the problems they investigated is particularly dubious, as 
the following discussion will show. 
 
3. Karl Marx and the Marxists 
Karl Marx’s contribution to political economy is dealt with in numerous works of Morishima 
and Negishi. Their attention focuses first and foremost on the theory of value and distribution 
and the theory of capital accumulation and economic dynamics, including Marx’s explanation 
of a long-run tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Morishima’s main works in this regard are 
two books: his Marx’s Economics: A Dual Theory of Value and Growth (1973) and, together 
with George Catephores, Value, Exploitation and Growth (1978). Both books met with a 
considerable interest and in the aftermath of the controversies in the theory of capital 
contributed to a sometimes heated debate about the merits and demerits of Marx’s economic 
analysis.13 
Negishi published a number of papers on Marx and compared Marx’s analysis especially with 
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s (see Negishi, 1980a). He is basically in agreement with 
Morishima in that also in his view the ‘essence of the labor theory of value lies … not so 
much in the proportionality of relative values and quantities of labor embodied as in the 
explanation of the profit created not in the process of circulation but in the process of 
                                                
13  The capital controversies had been triggered by a paper by Joan Robinson (1953), but 
as time went by it gradually became clear that she had benefited from discussions with Piero 
Sraffa whose 1960 book rekindled and broadened the debate; see Robinson (1970).  
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production’ (1982c, p. 199). This comes close to what Morishima dubbed the Fundamental 
Marxian Theorem. 
Value and distribution 
It does not come as a surprise that Morishima approaches also Marx from a von Neumann 
perspective. In his view the labour theory of value was used by Marx essentially as a device to 
aggregate microeconomic magnitudes and arrive at macroeconomic ones which are supposed 
to allow him to establish the ‘laws of motion’ of the economy as a whole (see, e.g., 1973, p. 
3). I think this is a valid observation in the light of the fact that Marx appears to have been 
convinced that this method provided him with a correct expression of the general rate of 
profit – the key variable of a capitalist economy. Once this rate was known, prices of 
production could be ascertained in a second step by appropriately marking up costs of 
production. 
However, Marx’s two-step procedure, or what Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz called Marx’s 
‘successivism’, cannot generally be sustained. As von Neumann and then Sraffa showed, the 
general rate of profit and relative prices can be determined without any recourse to labour 
values. Yet this aspect will concern us here only incidentally. We rather focus attention on 
Morishima and Catephores’s reconsideration of the labour theory of value in their 1978 book, 
because it is here that they themselves see a chief innovation in the discussion of Marx’s 
economics. Whereas labour values are conventionally (and also in Morishima, 1973) 
determined in terms of systems of simultaneous equations of the sort 
Bv = Av + l, 
where B is the (square) output coefficient matrix, A the (square) matrix of input coefficients 
of means of production,  l the vector of direct labour input coefficients and v the vector of 
labour values.14 Provided the inverse of matrix (B – A) exists, one gets 
v = (B – A)–1l 
This approach the two authors reject and replace it with an approach that ascertains labour 
values in terms of a von Neumann linear programming approach. The ‘true value’ of a 
commodity i is said to be obtained as a solution 
vi* = q*l 
to the following problem 
                                                
14  For a discussion of the determination of labour values in the presence of joint 
production, see Kurz and Salvadori (1995, chapter 8). 
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Minimise   ql 
subject to   qB ≥ qA + ei,   q ≥ 0, 
where q is the vector of the operation of processes and ei is the i-th unit vector (whose 
element i is unity, all the other elements being zero). Hence Morishima and Catephores’s ‘true 
values’ are those that minimize the amounts of labour needed directly and indirectly in the net 
production of one unit of the respective commodity.  
What has motivated this reconsideration? In his 1960 book, Sraffa had pointed out that ‘in the 
case of joint-products there is no obvious criterion for apportioning the labour among 
individual products, and indeed it seems doubtful whether it makes any sense to speak of a 
separate quantity of labour as having gone to produce one of a number of jointly produced 
commodities’ (p. 56). He went on to argue that with joint production it cannot be excluded 
that a ceteris paribus increase in the net output of one commodity might request a change in 
the proportions in which the different processes of production are activated such that a 
reduction in the total amount of (direct) labour employed results. Hence, one would have to 
conclude that the commodity under consideration ‘is in fact being produced by a negative 
quantity of labour’ (1960, p. 60; emphases in the original). Taking up Sraffa’s finding, 
Steedman (1975) then showed that there are cases in which positive profits may go together 
with a negative surplus value. This, however, flew in the face of Morishima’s 1973 
‘Fundamental Marxian Theorem’ (1973, pp. 53-54) that positive surplus value is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for positive profits. In order to save the Theorem, or some version of 
it, the concept of labour values had to be reconsidered with special regard to joint production: 
‘negative’ labour values had to be avoided. 
On the basis of their new definition Morishima and Catephores proved the following two 
propositions: 
(i) The surplus-to-necessary labour ratio, which the authors consider as the full 
measure of ‘exploitation’, is generally greater than the rate of surplus value, 
because of the non-additiveness of ‘true values’. 
(ii) The capitalist system is profitable and capable of expansion if and only if workers 
are exploited. This finding the authors now dubb ‘Generalized Fundamental 
Marxian Theorem’ (1978, p. 45-53). 
While the new concept of ‘true value’ manages to accomplish the pre-defined task, there are a 
number of features of this approach that are disquieting. First, some of the processes selected 
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by the above labour minimization problem need not be chosen by cost-minimizing producers 
at the given real wage rate, as analysed by John von Neumann (1945) and Sraffa (1960). 
Hence the solution Catephores and Morishima propose in order to get rid of negative labour 
values may relate to an economic system that differs substantially from the one actually in use 
(according to the solution of the choice of technique problem). It may be asked: What is the 
relevance of methods of production that are not employed for the actual economy and its 
characterisation? Secondly, and closely related to what has just been said, Marx insisted that 
in case differently ‘productive’ methods are used side by side, what matters is not the most 
productive one, but an average of those actually employed. Hence, Marx insisted that what 
matters are the actually employed methods and not some other methods. Finally, in their 
treatment of the ‘transformation problem’ of labour values in prices of production (1978, ch. 
6) the authors surprisingly do not start from ‘true values’ but from those conventional labour 
values that result from solving a system of simultaneous equations (see above). It remains 
thus somewhat unclear what labour values do mean and for what purpose they are needed. 
Falling tendency of the general rate of profit 
In two papers Negishi (1998b, 1999b) takes issue with the conventional interpretation of 
Marx’s law of the falling tendency of the rate of profit and its criticism in terms of the 
Shibata-Okishio Theorem. The theorem states that a new (single product) method of 
production, which reduces the unit cost of a (basic) product15, will be introduced by cost-
minimizing producers and, for a given real wage rate, of necessity raises the general (or 
competitive) rate of profit. This may well go along with an increase in the organic 
composition of capital. Hence, Marx’s respective argument in Volume III of Capital is seen to 
be flawed. 
Negishi disagrees with this assessment. The formalisation, he insists, does not faithfully 
represent Marx’s argument: ‘the model of an economy used to prove the Shibata-Okishio 
theorem may be too restrictive for Marx’ (1998, p. 253). The world that Marx had in mind, 
Negishi surmises, exhibits two crucial features not taken into account in the respective 
literature: 
(i) diminishing unit costs due to economies of scale and 
(ii) firms facing downward sloping demand curves. 
                                                
15  Using Sraffa’s definition (in the case of single production): a basic product is a 
product that enters directly or indirectly into the production of every product, whereas 
nonbasics don’t. 
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It is competition among capitalists vis-à-vis these two facts, which, in Negishi’s 
interpretation, is responsible for Marx’s law of a falling rate of profit. Marx’s basic idea, 
Negishi maintains, can be rendered clear in terms of Cournot’s model of oligopoly or 
Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition.16 These models, Negishi surmises, are 
appropriate for discussing the falling tendency of the rate of profit along Marx’s lines, 
whereas the ‘Walrasian assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition’ 
(1998b, p. 258) are not.17 
It suffices to limit our discussion to Negishi’s adaptation of Cournot’s model. Negishi 
assumes that each of n identical firms has a linear cost function 
     Ki = C + Dxi, i = 1, …, n 
Where K is the total cost of a firm, C and D are positive constants and xi is the output of the 
firm. D gives real wages per unit of output, where the real wage rate per unit of labour is 
assumed to be constant throughout the exercise. The demand function for the industry as a 
whole is given by 
     p = A – B(x1 + x2 + … + xn) 
where p is the price of the product and A and B are positive constants. Firms are taken to 
maximise profits, Pi = pxi – Ki. Negishi then calculates the Cournot-Nash solution of this 
simple model. 
Next he assumes that a new method of production is available which exhibits higher fixed 
costs C, which Negishi identifies with Marx’s ‘constant capital’ (or rather fixed capital), and 
lower variable costs (wages), which are said to largely correspond to Marx’s ‘variable 
capital’. The new method will be introduced by an innovating firm, provided it is profitable to 
do so, which is the case if a certain condition is met. The innovating firm will reap extra 
profits by exploiting the increasing returns, which, however, requires to increase the firm’s 
output and, a fortiori, thus aggregate output. Other firms will follow in adopting the new 
method, which leads to a general expansion of output. This, however, reduces the price of the 
product along the given and unchanging demand function and depresses the profits of each 
single firm. Under well-specified conditions the rate of profits on fixed capital is bound to 
fall. 
                                                
16  Negishi (1999b, pp. 235-8) extends the analysis somewhat and employs also a version 
of Krugman’s model of monopolistic competition and economies of scale. 
17  I set aside the problem whether the discussion of the law in terms of linear models of 
production with free competition as they were used by Okishio, Morishima or Steedman are 
well characterised as ‘Walrasian’. 
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Is this reconstruction convincing? Interestingly, Negishi himself has drawn the attention to a 
fact that raises doubts. He writes: ‘we have to admit that our analysis … is limited to that of 
the partial equilibrium, while the Shibata-Okishio theorem is obtained in the general 
equilibrium analysis of the perfect competition’ (1998b, p. 262). This is indeed the case. Put 
differently, while the technique used by the economic system under consideration changes, 
and economies could make themselves felt at an ever larger scale, they are prevented from 
doing so by a market demand function that stays put indefinitely. Hence, we get the peculiar 
result that despite technical advancement the real wage per unit of labour is constant and the 
general rate of profit falls. We might also say that the model tries to cross-breed a long-period 
(technical change) and a short period (given demand) perspective. I have doubts that it can 
successfully challenge the Shibata-Okishio theorem.18 
Unequal exchange and exploitation 
In a number papers Negishi (1991, 1993a, 1999a) enters into a discussion of the problem of 
unequal exchange and exploitation of workers as it was put forward in the 1970s. It is 
interesting to recall the motivation of these papers: Negishi stresses that the theory of the 
classical economists and Marx is fundamentally different from the neoclassical one and that it 
is therefore of interest to see what an alternative research programme has to offer. His 
attention focuses on the works of A. Emmanuel and then S. Amin and J.C. Saigal who argued 
inter alia that a country with a given low wage level is exploited by a country with a given 
higher wage level when the two trade with one another and capital is imported by the former. 
‘Being alerted by this Marxian attack on the neo-classical orthodoxy, Samuelson stood up 
quickly and tried to show the illogicality of neo-Marxian doctrine of unequal exchange.’ 
Negishi adds: ‘Samuelson seems, unfortunately, [to] misunderstand the main point of 
Emmanuel’s argument’ (1991, p. 37). Samuelson’s demonstration within a neoclassical 
framework of the gains from trade is said to be beside the point, because Emmanuel’s focus 
of attention is the possible deterioration of the terms of trade of the country with lower wages 
in comparison with the situation in which there are no wage differentials. It is an exogenously 
                                                
18  It should be noted that volumes II and III of Das Kapital were not yet ready for 
publication when Marx died in 1883. Frederick Engels prepared out of Marx’s unfinished 
notes, manuscripts and preliminary drafts the two volumes and interpolated between bits and 
pieces of material whenever he felt the need for it. The material was written at different times, 
and there is no reason to presume that Marx would have sustained all the views expressed in 
it. Therefore it is not at all clear what would have been Marx’s opinion on the various matters 
had he been given the time to prepare the two volumes for print. See on this Gehrke and Kurz 
(2006) with respect to Sraffa’s doubts as to the conventional interpretation of Marx’s law of 
the falling rate of profit. 
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given level of real wages for each country which constitutes the distinguishing feature of 
Emmanuel’s approach. In his second paper on the theme Negishi stresses that ‘even 
neoclassical economists may not be uninterested in classical and Marxist theories of 
international trade that are based on wage theories quite different than the neoclassical ones’ 
(1993a, p. 353). 
To begin with, it is interesting to emphasize that in Negishi’s view the theory of income 
distribution constitutes the main difference between classical and marginalist (neoclassical) 
theory. I believe, this is a valid observation. While the neoclassical theory tries to ascertain 
the distributive variables, especially the rate of profit (or interest) and the wage rate, in a 
symmetrical way in terms of the marginal contributions of ‘capital’ and labour to the product, 
the classical theory takes the real wage rate as given (and determined in another part of the 
theory) and ascertains the rate of profit residually, i.e., asymmetrically. Therefore, Negishi 
insists, it is not possible, to assess Emmanuel’s analysis strictly from a neoclassical 
perspective, as was done by Samuelson. Such a perspective of necessity involves putting the 
theory of unequal exchange into a Procrustean bed. 
This does not mean that Negishi subscribes to the analyses of Emmanuel and his followers. 
He points out that specialisation of countries is driven by comparative costs and thus relative 
prices which generally differ from relative labour values.19 This is due to the well known fact 
that relative prices depend not only on the technical conditions of production actually in use, 
but also on the division of the product between workers and capitalists. The impact of 
distribution on relative prices may be such that the pattern of specialisation, as one would 
expect it on the basis of labour values (which result in the special case in which the rate of 
profit is nil), is turned upside down: In terms of Ricardo’s famous numerical example, one 
could construct cases of the time profile of labour employed in the production of the different 
commodities in which at the prevailing rate of profit Portugal would specialise on cloth and 
England on wine. Negishi admits, however, that a model with an equalised rate of profit 
worldwide and differential, country-specific wage rates ‘does fit present-day reality much 
more than the orthodox neo-classical model, i.e., the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
international factor price equalisation’ (1991, p. 38). Yet, properly formalised, such a model 
does not lend support to some of the views proposed by Emmanuel, Saigal etc. Negishi is 
therefore on the lookout for a condition that would save the argument and, interestingly 
                                                
19  In systems with single production as they are assumed by Emmanuel and then 
Negishi, prices can be reduced to dated quantities of labour (Sraffa, 1960), which express this 
fact in a straightforward manner. 
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enough, discerns it in Ricardo’s assumption, discussed in the above, that the rate of profit 
need not be equalised even though capital can, in principle, move freely between countries. 
Negishi concludes: ‘It is quite ironical that unequal exchange in the sense of Saigal is 
impossible … in a free capitalist world, while it may be possible in a socialists’ world when 
an advanced country imposed a wrong pattern of specialisation to other countries’ (1991, p. 
47). 
 
4. The Marginalist Economists 
In their various papers and books Morishima and Negishi deal basically with all major early 
marginalist authors, especially William Stanley Jevons, Léon Walras, Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk, Alfred Marshall and Knut Wicksell. Due to space constraints, I focus attention on 
some of their comments on, and interpretations of, Walras, Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell. 
Léon Walras 
The third book of Morishima’s trilogy is devoted to Walras’s Economics. A Pure Theory of 
Capital and Money (1977). According to a widespread view, Walras’s concern was first and 
foremost the theory of exchange and allocation. This view is rejected by Morishima who 
insists that the theory of exchange and allocation was ‘but an overture to his general 
equilibrium theory of capital formation and circulation’ (pp. vii-viii). The amount of work 
devoted to rendering the ouverture mathematically rigorous Morishima considers excessive 
and culminating in a ‘complete sterilization’ of Walras’s theory. This criticism is explicitly 
levelled at models developed by Hicks (1967), Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Arrow and 
Hahn (1971) (see, e.g., p. 207). 
I think that some of Morishima’s criticisms of received interpretations of Walras are sound, 
whereas others cannot be sustained. He is right that Walras was not merely concerned with 
static problems of allocation, but with a system in motion, in which capital accumulates, the 
population grows and technical knowledge increases over time. In the system contemplated 
money and credit play an important role. These dynamic aspects have typically been set aside 
in some interpretations, which therefore have distorted Walras’s analysis. He is also right in 
stressing that as to the problems tackled there are several parallels between the analyses of 
Ricardo, Marx, Walras and Keynes: the ultimate aim of all four authors was to investigate 
‘how the capitalist system works’ (Morishima, 1977, p. 4). Walras even arrived at somewhat 
similar results as Ricardo with respect to the long-term development of important variables of 
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the economic system, such as wages, rents and the rate of profit, in the case in which 
diminishing returns due to the scarcity of land are not fully counteracted by the effects of 
technical progress (see Walras, 1954, pp. 390-1). However, this does not mean, as Morishima 
is inclined to think, that the analyses of the authors under consideration are essentially cast 
from a single die. He is led to this opinion because he re-interprets both Ricardo, Marx and 
Walras in terms of the von Neumann or rather  the ‘Walras-von Neumann model’ (1977, p. 
199). It is this uniform garb he puts on all three of them that makes them look alike, although 
under the garb they differ in important respects from one another.  
Fundamental objections can be raised against the view that there is a direct lineage and basic 
unité de doctrine leading from Ricardo and Marx to Walras and then Keynes (Morishima, 
1977, pp. 5-7). First, Walras himself saw the relationship between his work and that of 
Ricardo not as one of continuity, but rather as one of discontinuity and incompatibility. It 
suffices to recall the title of part 7 of the Elements of Pure Economics, ‘Exposition and 
Refutation of the English Theory’. In it Ricardo is accused of having committed ‘fundamental 
errors’ and of having failed to develop ‘a unified general theory to determine the prices of all 
productive services in the same way’ (Walras, 1954, p. 416). Secondly, such a unified general 
theory, Walras contended, has been elaborated by himself by generalising the principle of 
‘scarcity’, which the classical economists had limited to natural resources, to all goods and 
factors of production alike. A careful investigation of the classical and the Walrasian analyses 
shows indeed the main differences between the two, in particular, the surplus-based approach 
to the explanation of profits and rents of the former as opposed to the scarcity-based approach 
to all shares of income of the latter. Scrutinising part 7 of the Elements is also interesting 
because it demonstrates vividly that Walras could not but try to understand the contributions 
of Ricardo and the classical economists from the point of view of his own intellectual style, 
that is, demand-and supply analysis. He was therefore bound to misinterpret their main 
message and accuse them of errors, logical and other, which are not there and simply reflect 
Walras’s misapprehension of their doctrines; for a detailed exposition, see Kurz and Salvadori 
(2002). It is interesting to note that misinterpretations of Walras’s kind, based as they are, on 
taking some type of approach or intellectual style as an absolute measure to assess all other 
approaches or intellectual styles, abound in the history of economic thought.20 
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Knut Wicksell 
                                                
20  For example, recently Sraffa’s reformulation and rectification of the classical approach 
to the problem of value and distribution has been discussed by some commentators as if it was 
a contribution to intertemproal general equilibrium theory (see Hahn, 1982). 
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Triggered by a paper by Bo Sandelin (1980), there has been a debate about Knut Wicksell’s 
Austrian theory of value and distribution that is known as ‘Wicksell’s missing equation’. The 
emphasis is on Wicksell’s treatment of the economy’s endowment of capital at a given point 
in time in order to ascertain the rate of interest as a (relative) scarcity index of capital, 
reflecting marginal productivity of this factor of production. The issue under consideration is 
whether or not Wicksell had put forward a theory of capital and interest that is closed in the 
sense that the data, or independent variables, from which he started suffice to determine the 
unknowns, or dependent variables, especially the ‘natural’ rates of wages, rents and interest. 
The claim was put forward that there is one equation ‘missing’ in Wicksell’s theory and that 
therefore his formal system of equations is underdetermined. The question then is how to 
close the system in a way that is faithful to Wicksell. The authors that contributed to the 
debate differ in terms of the closures they suggest. 
It is interesting to note that the view was widespread that there was indeed an equation 
missing in Wicksell’s construction. The authors that advocated this view also agreed that a 
consistent closure necessitated taking the overall ‘quantity’ and composition of social capital 
as endogenously determined. This in turn implied that the system had to be assumed to be in a 
stationary state in which there was neither accumulation nor decumulation of capital, because 
in such a state the capital stock is fully adjusted to the other data of the Wicksellian (or, more 
generally, marginalist) system, that is, (i) the preferences of agents, (ii) the technical 
alternatives from which cost-minimising producers can choose, and (iii) the given amounts of 
the other factors of production, labour(s) and land(s). In a stationary state all independent 
variables (including factor endowments) do not change any longer, nor do the dependent 
variables. With a zero rate of accumulation, incentives to invest and incentives to disinvest 
must obviously just balance each other. This means that the (overall) rate of interest equals 
the (overall) rate of time preference. 
In a comment on Sandelin’s paper, Negishi (1982a, p. 310) confirms Sandelin’s claim as to 
the missing equation. In a related paper dealing with Eugen von Böhm-Bawer’s famous 
‘Three Grounds’ of interest he rightly stresses that closing the system via a given amount of 
capital in value terms, which is Wicksell’s closure, deprives the analysis of much of its 
explanatory power (1982b, p. 164). He makes essentially the same point in chapter 9 of his 
Economic Theories in a Non-Walrasian Tradition (Negishi, 1985). 
While Negishi sides with Sandelin, he is very clear that Wicksell actually closed the system 
by considering the available ‘amount of capital’ (Wicksell, 1934, p. 204) at the beginning of 
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the production period as given in value terms, representing a certain quantity of the 
numeraire. In equilibrium that sum of value – the ‘supply of capital’ – must then be equal to 
the value of capital employed – the ‘demand for capital’ –, which consists of ‘labour power 
capital’ and ‘land power capital’. The different quantities of the latter, employed in different 
periods of time, have to be appropriately discounted forward. There is clear evidence that 
Wicksell did not like this closure and therefore vacillated a good deal in his analysis. To be 
forced to take the capital endowment in value terms destroyed the sought analogy between the 
different factors of production, with labour(s) and land(s) all given in terms of their natural 
physical measures, whereas heterogeneous capital goods had to be given in terms of an 
abstract standard in an attempt to determine the competitive rate of return on social capital. 
There can be no doubt that Wicksell thought that there was no equation missing. He actually 
insisted with reference to the equation just described: ‘we shall then obtain the necessary 
[additional] relation, and the problem will at last be completely determinate’ (Wicksell, 1934, 
pp. 204-5; emphasis added). 
As Negishi appears to imply in his contributions, Wicksell’s failure puts in sharp relief the 
fact that marginalist long-period analysis cannot generally be sustained. In the stationary state 
the forces it contemplates have seized to exert their influence, and the stationary state is at any 
rate rather uninteresting because no real economy, as Wicksell stressed, can ever be taken to 
come close to it or even be in it.21 Negishi does not attempt to save long-period marginalist 
analysis, he rather points out that the closures mentioned in the literature do not exhaust the 
set of alternatives and suggests himself two further variants. In one he introduces explicitly 
the saving behaviour of the capitalist, which derives from intertemporal utility maximisation. 
This involves, he stresses, considering ‘the value of capital as an endogenous variable’ 
(1982a, p. 310). In his other contribution (Negishi, 1982b) he develops an overlapping 
generations model with a stationary population, where each agent lives for two periods, the 
first being the working period, the second the retirement period. In the former the income of 
the agent exceeds her consumption, that is, she saves, whereas in the latter things are the other 
way round, that is, she dissaves all the capital previously built up. Negishi demonstrates that 
even assuming away time preference, the rate of interest may be positive due to the individual 
                                                
21  Contrary to Wicksell, Robert Lucas (1988, p. 11) maintained that ‘for any initial 
capital K(0) > 0, the optimal-capital consumption path (K(t), c(t)) will converge to the 
balanced path asymptotically.’ He added: ‘That is, the balanced path will be a good 
approximation to any actual path “most” of the time [and that] this is exactly the reason why 
the balanced part is interesting to us’. This is a bold statement that sounds rather weird 
especially at the time of a deep economic crisis worldwide. 
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agent’s concern with better provision for wants in the second than in the first period and the 
superiority of more roundabout processes of production. Hence, Wicksell is said to have been 
right in his criticism of Böhm-Bawerk that time preference was not all that important in the 
theory of interest. 
 
5. John Maynard Keynes22 
Keynes, as is well known, singled out a few economists, including Thomas Robert Malthus, 
as anticipating, in one form or another, the principle of effective demand. This principle states 
that there is no reason to presume that investment demand can be expected to gravitate around  
levels that equal savings at full employment-cum-full capacity income. Keynes chastised as 
‘classical economics’ those views that were based on Say’s law, where he interpreted this law 
in the neoclassical sense as involving also the clearing of the labour market(s), i.e. full 
employment. 
Keynes’s view of Malthus and the classical economists is difficult to sustain. Negishi is right 
in arguing that Malthus was not a precursor of Keynes, but despite appearances to the 
contrary ‘a supply-side economist who emphasized the motives to produce as a function of 
the rate of profit’ (1993c, p. 116; see, in greater detail, Negishi, 1989, pp. 139 and 143-7). By 
assuming that every act of saving will swiftly be followed by an act of investment of the same 
magnitude, Malthus deprived himself of the possibility of arguing that there can be a general 
glut of commodities. In his criticism Ricardo mercilessly uncovered the logical 
inconstistencies of Malthus’s argument (see on this Kalmbach and Kurz, 2008). 
While Walrasian general equilibrium theory is said to be ‘a paradigm of modern economics, 
Keynesian economics may perhaps be called another paradigm of modern economics’ 
(Negishi, 1993b, p. 53). However, Negishi maintains, the so-called ‘Keynesian revolution … 
was not a thoroughgoing revolution, since it could not penetrate micro-economics’ (ibid.). 
Neoclassical economists responded to the challenge of Keynesianism in terms of developing 
                                                
22  In this section I comment only on a few issues discussed by the two authors in regard 
of Keynes’s contribution to economics. Especially Morishima’s huge project of incorporating 
ideas of Keynes (and other non-orthodox economists) in a new formulation of general 
equilibrium theory, which culminated in Morishima (1992), can only be mentioned in 
passing.  
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models based on theories of expectations, uncertainty, adjustment cost and disequilibrium, 
which were able to explain unemployment due to rigidities etc. In Negishi’s view, these 
models have not pre-emptied the need for some alternative theory: ‘we still need Keynesian 
economics to explain persistent large-scale depression and unemployment’ (ibid., p. 54). This 
assessment Negishi put forward in 1993, after he had himself, in the 1970s, developed some 
non-Walrasian general disequilibrium models based on sticky or rigid prices; see especially 
his book Microeconomic Foundation of Keynesian Macroeconomics (Negishi, 1979). Yet 
these models, whatever their merits, were not fully satisfactory to him. First, they did not 
faithfully represent Keynes’s argument, which was not based on sticky prices, but rather 
contended that with flexible prices the situation might get worse due to the destabilising 
effects of deflationary tendencies, and secondly they left in the dark why prices were what 
they are and under what circumstances they would change. In short, Keynes’s analysis could 
not be reduced to the economic effects of rigidities. 
In Negishi’s view, as I interpret it, the Keynesian revolution is still to be accomplished. As 
regards explaining persistent unemployment, Negishi singles out Azariadis’s theory of 
implicit contracts between firms and workers and the difference between the two parties as to 
risk aversion as one of the most promising alternatives; see, especially, Negishi (1979, pp. 
227-35). 
Morishima originally had the plan to write also a book on ‘Keynes’s Economics’, but then  
changed his mind. One of the reasons for this was that he was convinced that the problem of 
unemployment emerged already once Walras’s theory was properly formalised. As he was 
keen to show in chapter 7, ‘Towards Keynes’, of his Walras’s Economics, the Walrasian 
equilibrium is over-determined, which he interpreted as implying that we must consider a 
Keynesian unemployment equilibrium. 
Morishima’s argument was not well received in the literature. William Jaffé accused him of 
confusing his own problems with those of Walras, while Negishi (1980b) questioned the 
correctness of the derivation of Morishima’s surprising result. In terms of simplified versions 
of Morishima’s model he established the fact that there was no overdeterminacy. He did this, 
first, with respect to a model in which Say’s law holds, more specifically, in which savers are 
also investors.23 He then turned to an economic system with four classes – workers, 
landowners, capitalists and entrepreneurs. According to Morishima this is the socio-economic 
stratification Walras had in mind, with savings coming (almost) exclusively from capitalists 
                                                
23  It goes without saying that this is a very special case of Say’s law.  
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and with investments decided (almost) exclusively by entrepreneurs. In this perspective 
Walras is much closer to Keynes than is generally assumed, because the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs is different from and independent of the behaviour of capitalists and 
necessitates the introduction of an investment function in addition to a savings function. 
For the sake of the argument Negishi follows Morishima’s proposition and adds an 
investment function to the system. However,  with the additional equation there comes an 
additional variable, the rate of interest. The result is that ‘the introduction of the Keynesian 
investment function into the Walrasian system does not lead to the over-determinacy of the 
Walrasian system … Thus the problem of over-determinacy cannot be a proper starting point 
for the journey from the Walrasian towards the Keynesian system’ (Negishi, 2000, p. 260). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We may now draw some conlusions from the above analysis, focusing on a comparison of the 
two authors under consideration. The first thing that strikes the reader is that both Morishima 
and Negishi are authors with a thorough interest in and knowledge of some of the most 
important traditions in the history of economic thought. They are very well read and erudite 
and have studied with great care and circumspection the contributions of many of the great 
economists from Adam Smith (and before) to our times. Secondly, both are interested in the 
history of economic thought because they consider the works of the old masters as a fertile 
source of valuable ideas, only some of which have been absorbed into contemporary 
economic theory. A study of these works has thus nothing to do with morbid antiquarianism. 
It rather expresses the conviction that even nowadays we can still learn from Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, Karl Marx, Léon Walras, Knut Wicksell, John Maynard Keynes etc. Third, 
according to the views of our two authors such learning often requires that old ideas are 
incorporated into modern analytical frameworks – an elaborated version of the von Neumann 
model in the case of Morishima or a partial or general equilibrium model in the case of 
Negishi. It is the combination of reconfigured existing ideas, old and new, that embodies the 
potential of analytical progress and can be expected to improve our understanding of 
economic facts and processes. However, as especially Negishi admits, there are cases in 
which certain old ideas run counter to, and therefore are incompatible with, modern analytical 
frameworks. In such cases the respective ideas cannot be made to speak to us by integrating 
them into some existing theory or model. It is rather necessary to develop a framework that is 
conducive to them. Fourth, in at least one important respect the two authors approach the 
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history of economic thought from rather different perspectives. While Morishima appears to 
be convinced that such diverse authors as, in particular, Ricardo, Marx, Walras and Keynes 
can all be brought together and their ideas synthesised and integrated into a coherent whole, 
Negishi variously expresses the view that there are differences between different authors that 
cannot (easily) be overcome. These different perspectives are reflected in the very different 
characters of the two authors’ works. Morishima attempted to elaborate a sort of metatheory 
that incorporates various old masters’ analyses. His trilogy in particular expresses his concern 
with building an overarching system of economic analysis. Negishi is much more cautious in 
this regard and refrains from engaging in such a demanding enterprise. His contribution 
consists mostly of short papers, each of which is dedicated to a particular problem at hand 
which is then typically, but not always, dealt with in terms of a formalisation. 
These different perspectives, and this is my fifth and final observation, imply somewhat 
different attitudes towards the historical material. Morishima emphasises time and again that 
his main concern is not with a comprehensive, let alone complete, historical reconstruction of 
the works under consideration, but with identifying those elements that point beyond the 
respective author’s own work and contribute to the genealogy of modern theory. Hence, 
Morishima sees past authors first and foremost from the perspective of what they contributed 
to modern theory, as conceived by Morishima. He attempts to localise their works as 
processing elements in this development. Compared with him Negishi places a good deal 
more attention on historical reconstructions that are faithful to the authors under 
consideration. He insists on the variety and complexity of ideas and is less prepared to try to 
integrate them into an allegedly coherent whole. 
But whatever may be the differences between their approaches to the history of economic 
theories, both deserve praise for having broadened and deepened our understanding both of 
past authors, alternative approaches to economic problems and contemprary economic theory. 
They belong to a small group of truly remarkable economists who combined an interest in 
economic theories with an interest in their emergence and development and in the yet 
unexploited potentials of elaborating on and judiciously combining received and new ideas. 
As one of the two scholars succinctly put it: ‘Economics is a science which cannot dispense 
with its history’ (Negishi, 1993b, p. 55). 
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